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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
ROAD COMMISSION,

Pfointiff-Appellamt,

vs.

Case No.

REED E. LARKIN AND UARDA G.
LARKIN, fos wife; FEDERAL
LAND BANK OF BERKELEY;
FRED E. KEELER II.

l2537

Def e ndants-Respondents.
1

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action in eminent domain brought by
plaintiff to acquire a portion of defendants' land in the
vicinity of
Box Elder County, Utah, for the
hip;hway construction of an interchange of Interstate-80
and U.S. Highway 30.
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DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT
r:ehe defendant, Federal Land Bank of Berkeley, disclaimed any interest in the land taken (R. 247) and the
defendant Fred E. Keller II dPfaulted (R. 24G). The case
was tried on the sole issue of tlw amount of jm;t compensation to lw awarded tlw dc>frndants, Reed E. Larkin and
Uarda G. Larkin, n•spondents hPrein. At the lwginning
of the trial it was sti pula t<>d between the parties that
the value of the land and improvenwnts tab•n was in
the amount of$6,214.51(R.17, 20).
The only issues rPmaining for trial went to t11e d('termination of tlw amount of darnagPs which will accrue
to the portion of defendants' property not sought to br>
cond(:'mned and the amount of benefit to that portion
caused by the construction of the improvement proposed
by plaintiff. Utah Code Ann.
(1953). These
issues were submitted to the jury who returned a special
verdict (R. 302) finding damages to defendants' remaining property of $3,040.00 and benefits thereto of $540.
The total Judgment therefore was $8,714.51 arriv(:'d at
as follows (R. 303):
Value of land and improvements taken
(by Stipulation) __________________________ -- ____________ $6,214.f)l
Damages to remaining property by reason
of tlw construction ---------------------------------- 3,040.00
$9,25-:t-.f)l
Benefits accruing to rPmaining property
by reason of the construction________________ 540.00
TOTAL JUDG:MENT TO
DEFJ'.JNDANTS ______________________________ $8,714.51

1

During the rebuttal argument of the defendant's'
counsel on summation, argument was made that the defendants are damaged due to a reduction of 44 cattle
in their operation as set forth in the court's statement
of proceedings (R. 200, 310, 319). Inasmuch as the
closing arguments of counsel were not reported plaintiff
has submitted its Statement of Proceedings (R. 310)
which was allowed and approved as amended by the
court and is made a part of the record on appeal (R. 319).
RELIEF SOUGH_T ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a new trial to determine the amount
of damages and benefits which will accrue to the portion
of defendants' property not sought to be condemned.
STATEMENT OF FACT'S
This is a case involving the condemnation by the
plaintiff of 79.493 acres of land owned by Reed E. Larkin
and U arda G. Larkin (hereinafter referred to as defendants), which land constitutes a part of the defendants'
total ownership tract of 640 acres. The taking is designa tPd as parcels 8 :A and SB :A of Project I-SON-5(8)4
and is for the construction of Interstate-SO where it bypasses the town of Snowville just south of the Idaho
border.
subject property is located approximately
J miles west of Snowville, Utah. (R. 5, 39)
As indicated above, the sole question for the jury was
the issue as to the amount of damages if any, to the
ch•ft>ndants' remainder parrels of which there were three

4
as of the date of take on Decemrwr 24, J 969. (R. 9).
Reference is made to the exhibit map attached at the rnd
of this brief and made a part hereof which constitutes
a reproduction to a reduced scale of exhibit P-1 entered
into evid<-•nce by plaintiffs at the trial. (R. 17) It will
be noticed that the three remainder parcels consist of a
44.93 acre parcel located in the northeast corner of defendants' property, 17.95 acres located in the northwest
corner of defendants' property, and 497.63 acres remaining to the south of the take.

Tlw construction to bP placed upon the area of
:
takp constitutes the relocation of existing Highway u;.;30 where it ·will cross over Interstate-SO when construction is completed. Existing US-30 to the west of the
project will be obliterated between the project and point
of connection with the US-30 relocation. (R. 7) Also an
interchange will br constructed providing access to and
from the new freeway in either direction, and a 50 ft.
wide public right of way designated as a stock trail will
be constructed with a gravel base along the southerly
edge of the InterstatP Highway, connecting about ll;-1 to
Vl, milrs east with a countv
road knO\vn as Locomotive
.J
Springs Road and west with US-30. (R. 7, 129). The take
for the construction of the foregoing has been designated as Parcel No. 8 :A.
Parcel No. SB :A constitutes a taking of no acreage
but consists of a relinquishment of approximately 255
fePt of access along US-:JO at the west end of the north0ast remainder, a place which had not lwen use<l by fk-

frn<lant:::; to gain acce:::;s to US-i30. Other than the relinqui:::;hment of access for Parcel No. SB :A the northeast
remainder has the same unlimited access to US-30 as
iJrior to the talw. Access to the northwest remainder was
at all points along US-30 relocation from the west
boundary thereof to the point of beginning of the nonaccess line as indicated on the attached exhibit P-1 (R. 8,
125-127), at which point the relocation of US-30 is at its
highest grade along the open access consisting of approximately 5 feet. ( R. 13()). Similar access could be
gained to the south remainder along the corresponding
frontage on the oposite side of the highway and at all
points along the stock trail except for the extreme
·wt•st portion thereof (R. 16, 126-127).
The highest and best use for the land in the before
condition was its present agricultural use. It had been
ust>d for some dry farming but was used mainly for
<'aitle grazing during three or four months every winter,
(R 5, 144-145) During this period approximately 5-6
acres per head of cattle could be utilized. (R. 149, 169,
174) The cattle had watered in the Curlew Creek to the
south. (R. 42, 146)
POINT I
THE COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO ALLOW
PLAINTIFF TO OFFER EVIDENCE OF SALES OF COMPARABLE PROPERTY LOCATED ON OTHER INTERSTATE
IiIGHWAY INTERCHANGE LOCATIONS AS EVIDENCE
OF BENEFITS TO DEFENDANTS' REMAINDER PARCELS.

•

(a) The court erred; in refusi,ng cross-exami'nla,tion
by plaintiff on comparable sales.
( b) The conrt abused its discretion in refusing to

allow testimony of comparable sales on direct
examination.

It was agrt'ed by all a1ipraisers for both parties that
under the present agricultural highest and best use of
the pl'operty for a cattle grazing operation the two north
remainders were damaged. Cattle placed thereon would
no longer have free access to CurlPw Creek for watering.
It was further agreed by the appraisal witnesses for
both parties that at least a portion of defendants l'PmaindPr parcels had Leen lie1wfited due to a change in
t]1e highest and best use from an agricultural to a commercial us<:' vrimarily for a service station site. It is
plaintiff's position that the court committed prejudicial
error in connection with the determination of the amount
of severance darnages (see Point II, infra) and special
benefits discussed hereafter.
The amenities of defendant's remainder parcels for
commercial use would be better than many commercial
i11t0rchange sites. It is located on the junction of US
Highway 30 and Interstate 80 with full ingress and
to Interstate-SO for traffic traveling in either
direction. It would be
normal entry to the freeway
system for Snmvville residents traveling to and from
Idaho and a common point for all local as well as long
distance traffic to pass. (R. 192). A service station
placed on defendants' remainders would be the first
such station for 35 miles along the Interstate Highway

1

in (_•itlier direction, the closest service to the north being
in Nubldte, Idaho and the closest to the south being in
Tremonton, Utah (R. 131, 150). rrhe service station would
have full exposure to traffic corning from either direction
on the Freeway or US-30 such that if a service stdion sign
·were placed thereon it could be seen for as far as five
miles (R. 192).
(a) The court erred in refitsing cross-examiina-

tion by plaintiff on comparable sales.

rrhe testimony of both of defendants' appraisal witll!:'SSees, Marcellus K. Palmer and Don Chadwick, was
identical a8 to the amount of benefit arising out of the
proposed interchange construction. They testified that
the only lorntion which would be benefited was a two acre
commercial site at the extreme west end of the northwest remainder parcel (R. 49-50, 104) upon which they
place the value of $250 per acre or a total of $500 compared with $70 per acre for the two acres in the before
condition. The difference, therefore, was a $360 benefit
to set off against damages. They based their $250 per
acre value solely upon an unsolicited, unaccepted offer
n'ceived by the defendants from a Snowville resident,
Carl Cobia, who offered to buy the two acres for $500.
(R. 49-51; 103-104). At no time had the defendants listed
the property for sale or in any way attempted to locate
buyers therefor, or determined whether Mr. Cobia would
1Jay more than his original offer. (R. 88-89)
Following the direct examination of defendants' first
HlJpraisal \\'ihwss, Mr. Palmer, plaintiff attempted to
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determine on cross-examination the extent to which Mr.
Palmer based his opinion of benefits upon comparable
sales and to point out the factors of similarity between
the subject property and land sold at other interchange
locations in Box Elder County. Plaintiff was not ewn
allowed to ask Mr. Palmer if he knew about the sales.
After asking Mr. Palmer if he were aware of sales that
occurred north of Tremonton which were also located
upon an interchange of Interstate SO and US highway 30,
the court snstained defendants' objection to any inquiry
into those sales or salt'8 more rP111ote,
though
plaintiff indicated to tlw court that there were no sales
(cc 17,j
of, less remote from the subject property. During
the coun.;e of tl10 cross-examination by tlw plaintiff, thP
following (ftiesbon was put to l\[r. Palmer by plaintiff:
"Q. Are you acquaint('d "-ith the sale to Max
\Valker of the corners located on the junction of
U.S. 30 and I-SO north of Tremonton'?
J\IAKX: Xow, if the court please, that
would have no bearing, it would be too remote.
You're comparing a vc>ry industrial area. I object
to it as impro1wr cross examination.
COURT: Sustained.
"MR. EVANR: :Maybe I don't understand the
court's ruling. rrh(' court is saying I'd have to come
somewhere clo::;er in proximity to arrive at the
commercial value of interchange
"THE COURT: \Vhy, certainly. An interchange at Salt Lake isn't the same as an interrhange at Brigham, and the interchange at Brigham isn't the same as the one at Snmvville, an<l
the 1ntrrchane at Tremonton isn't the same as-

I

I

j
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"MR. EVANS: Your honor, you go where
you have them, don't
One of the assets of
this property is that you don't have anything for
forty miles until they get to Tremonton, or twenty
miles when you get to Idaho.
1

"THE COURT: You have one within two
miles of Snowville. Isn't there an interchange
there¥
"l\IR. EVANS: A comparable
"THE COURT: Isn't there an interchange
there¥
"MR. EVANS: Oh, there will be, yes, your
honor, but there are no sales.
"THE COURT: All right. That's what I'm
talking about. You can find probably a comparable sale at a place and location near Salt Lake.
How that relates-or even Tremonton. How that
relates to here, I can see no materiality at all.
"MR. EiVANS : Well, could we leave this,
your honor, for the testimony of the appraisers,
to be able to determine whether or not there is
In other words, I haven't had
an opportunity to try and show corporability.
''THE COURT: Well, if you're going to
start talking about interchanges down at Tremonton, I will sustain the objection.
"MR. EVANS: Okay, well, then for the
record the court's ruling is that the state will have
no opportunity to even show comparability to any
-bet-ween the subject property and any interchanges in tbe general Tremonton area or south.
Is this the court's
"MR. MANN: That's the law. It's got to be
comparable.
you.

"MR. EVANS: I'm asking the court, thank
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''THE COURT: You've got to have it in the
area that you're talking about.'' (R-89-90)
r_11he law has been generally stated in Utah that evidence of the price paid for other similar property is
admissible as evidence to show the value of the property
in question. Plaintiff does not dispute that when evidence
of comparable sales is offered on direct examination, the
trial court has broad discretion to determine whether
the properties are sufficiently similiar to have some
bearing on the value under consideration, and to be of
any aid to the jury, and that such discretion of the court
will not be interferred with unless clearly abused. State
Road Conim. v. Wood, 22 Utah 2d 317, 452 P.2d 872
(1909) Salt Lak<' County 1.i. Kazura, 22 Utah 2d 313, 452
P.2d 869 (1969); State Road Comm. v. Peterson, 12 Utah
2d 317, 366 P.2d 76, (1961); Soiithern Pacific Company
v. Arthur, 10 Utah 2d 306, 332 P.2d 693 (1960); Tellitride Power Company v. Bruneau, 41 Utah 4, 125 Pac.
399 (1912).
Ho-wever, the foregoing rule granting the trial court
broad discretion to determine similarity does not pertain
to comparable sales offered on cross-examination to impeach the credibility of expert testimony. Even on direct
examination the court is required to admit the testimony
once it determines in its discretion that the offered sales
are reasonably similar. 84 A.L.R. 2d 110. But on cross
examination the degree of comparability goes only to
the weight and not the competency, hence no determination of similarity is required. This distinction is summarized in Nichols as follows:

11

"Thus, by way of summary, it has been held
that evidence of sales of comparable properties
may be offered under three conditions:
(a) On direct examination of expert or lay
witnesses, as independent substantive evidence of
the value of the property to which the comparison
relates:
( b) On direct examination o.f the expert
witness, to given an account of the factual basis
upon which he founds his opinion on the issue of
value of the real estate in controversy; or
( c) On cross-examination of the expert witness to test his knowledge, experience and investigation and thus affect the weight to be given to
his opinion.
It has been stated that the criteria for similarity varies in diminishing degrees for each category. Thus, when used as substantive proof of the
value of the property taken, the strict foundation
requirements must be met. A lesser foundation
of comaparbility is required when evidence of
other sales is offered in support of, and as background for, opinion testimony, and not as indedependent substantive evidence of value. The reas01z.s of relrvancy) which requ.ire 1tha:t a foundation
of sim1.larity be laid for direct examination) vanish
when evidence of other sales is elicited 'rupon cross
e.ramination to impeach an expert. In the latter
instance lack of comparabili:ty goes to the weight)
rather than competency) of the evidence/' (emphasis addf"d) 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain) pp
21-50, 21-51 §21.3[3] (3d Ed.).

As pointed out in State Engineering Commissio% v.
Peck) 1 Ftah 2<l 263, 265 P.2d 630 (1953), this does not

mean that the court does not retain discretion in crossexamination concerning matters of time and confusion
which may enter into a trial, but in the instant case the
trial court refused to allow cross-examination on comparable sales because they were not competent-they
were ''too re111ote" - and plaintiff submits that the
trial court was in l'lTor in so restricting plaintiff's crossexamination.
Tlw Peck case lends support to the rule that a
foundation as to similarity may lw required on <lireet
examination but not crrnss-exmuitation. That case n·vt•rsed the trial court for refusing to allow evidence of
comparable sal1c•s on eithPr direct or cross-Pxamination.
ln refuring to the admissibility of such l vidence on
.direct e.f(Wli11atim1 this eourt stated that then' must b<' a
s110wing of similarity between the two properties and
that this is a preliminary que::;tion for tlH• trial jnclge
to determine before evidence of sales is wlmissihle. Ko
such n·<1uirement is set forth by the court for allowing
testimony on cross-exaniination of the pricP paid for
comparable sales. Although some discn•tion must he
allowed a trial judge ·where matters of time and confusion enter into a trial, as the court stated, generally on
cross-examination a showing of th• witnPss' knowh'clge
of other sales of similar propert:' should he allowed:
1

"Also, evidence of tlw price paid for similar
property is admissible on C'ross-Pxmnination of
witness who have snhmitt<•d an opinion of the
value of the property in question. 11 his is allowPd
Ly most courts even in jnrisdictions which exeludc
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such evidence on direct examination. Where such
direct evidence is admissible to show the value
of the property in question it is also admissible
for that purpose on cross-examination, it is also
admissihle to test the qualifications of the witness
to testify as to value, for impeachment purposes
and to
the \V('ight and credibility to be
given to such opinion evidence.
is no other
instrunwnt so well adapted to discovery of the
truth as cross-examination, and as long as it tends
to disclose the truth it should never be curtailed
or limited. Any inquiry shonld be allowed which
an individual about to
would feel it in his
interest to make. On eross-exarnination a showing
of the witnes::;' knowlPdge of other sales of similar
property should be allowed with the details of
snel1 sales and tlw itPws which such witness used
in arriving at his valuation of the property. This
would at least requin a disclosure of the amount
received in sueh other sales and the amount of
each item used by the witness in arriving at his
overall valuation. In 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 183, §18.45(2), it is said:
1

'The scope of the cross-examination of experts and other witnt>sses who have testified
to value in land damage cases is very broad
sim·t> cross-examination is often the only protection of tlw opposing party against the unwarranted estimatPs that a certain class of
l!HTcenan· PXJH'rts i::; wont to indulge in. A
witnPss may be askt>d on eross-exarnination
anv facts \1.·hiclt wonld lw admi8siLle on direct
ti on, . . . A wi bwss \\'ho has given
an opinion of value may, however, in the
di8crdion of' t11P eonrt, be asked questions
on cross-t>xarnina ti on, for the p¥#pose of testing his opinion, whieh would be improper up-
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on direct examination. He may, for example,
be asked how far certain assumed facts would
modify his judgment, or be required to state
his opinion as to the value of similar lands
in the neighborhood .... '"I Utah 2d at 273-274.

In BoHgeois v. State 11 ighu·ay Conun., 179 Kan. :m,
292 P.2d GS:3 (195G), tlw ruling of the trial rourt which
limited the cross-examination by appellant of appPllet''s
expert witnesses as to comparable sales bas<>d in pa, t
upon their remoteness to the subj<>ct property was found
to be prejudicial error and tlw judgment was H'versecl
due to appl'llant nut being affordC>d a fair trial. Jn commenting upon the undue restriction of cross-examination
the court stated:
"These three witnesses were placed on the
stand by ap1wlh'e as P::qwrt'.> Tlwy were well qualified to state tht•ir opinions, and they all testified
as to tlw valut> of ap1wllant 's property (citation
omitted). This was proper but appellant had the
right m1 cross-examination to frst the cr('dibility
of the testimony of the witnesses by nsking qualifying questions as to the exfrnt of t]w knowl(Hlge
on the part of each witness, and
to eaeh and
elem('nt that sueh witness totlk into consideration in arriving at his opinion of t]w vahw
of the property. That part of the record sd out
herein
appellant ·was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examination PppelleP's
es and sh0 was prPjudiced thereby in the trial. On
cross-Pxamination great latitude is necessarily indulged in order that the intelligence of the witness, his powers of discernment and his capacity
to form a corrPct judgrnPnt may be submitted
to the jury so it may have an opportunity for
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determining thP value of his testimony." (citations
omitted) 292 P.2d at 686.
ThP fort>going was approvPd in Cline v. K a.nsas Gas

a11d Rlectric Co., 18:2 Kan. 155, 318 P.2d 1000 (1957),

wherein the judgment of the trial court was reversed
and a new triul granted based in part upon the sustaining by the lo\\"(•r court of an objection to a question on
cross-f•xamination concerning a comparable sale.
Tl11· quot<• from N iclwls, supra, has been quoted with
approval in State of Idaho v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 454
P.:.!d 5G (19G9) and Delaware Highway Department v.
0.06'73 acres of land, :2:2-1- A.:2d 598 (Del. 1966). Th<> Dele1('(lre Hi_r1hway Department case was similar to the in-·
stant casP in that on direct examination the expert witll('SS did not 11wntion any comparable sales. On cross<•xamination as to eornparables a motion to strike the
witness' amnn•r on the ground that a sale was too remote
was deniPd by the trial court. In affirming that action
the Supreme Court stated:
"(A)ny irrekvancy in the purported comparable
m:'ecl as a basis for the expert opinion under attad;:, including remoteness in time, goes to the
wc•igh t to be accorded the opinion and not to the
admissihility of th<" Pvidence of the other sale."
224 A.2d at 601.
(b) Tli1· rourt abused its discrctiO'n i n refusing to
allow testimony of cm11parable sales on direct examination.
1

of othPr frre\\·ay interchange properties 110\\"< vn, \\·hieh plaintiff's appraisors consi<lerPd
Hmw(l npon
1
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to be l'.OH1parable, Yictor Smith, apprait-ml witness for
lJlainliff, testified that six acrPs were chang1c•d to cornlllt'rcial property the value of $1,500 per acre (R. 156lG/; Exh. P--±) and Mr. Cain testified that all of the
acrPage in the northwest remainder had increased in
value to $2,500 an acn• and all of the acreage in the northeast remainder had increased in value to $500 prr acre.
( R. 185-186 ; Exh. P -5)
On direct examination of plaintiff's appraisal witness, l\Ir. Cain, }ip was askell \\·hat c01i1parahle saks
relied upo11 in read1ing his conclusion as to the amount
of bem•fit defrndanb had receivt>d. JHr. Cain indicat<·u
5 sales of interchang<'
::-;ales lwtween Brig1
ham City and r1 rt•111onton, and 2 sales northwest of
Tremonton. Tlw trial court tlwn sustained <ld'endant's
objection to further testimony on
one of the sal(•s
the location was too remote, notwitlu,tanding
l\Ir. Cain's testimony that
sak \,·as <lPfinitc•ly comparable (R. 189-191). Furtlwnnore, plaintiff proffered
P[\rlie1jwhen he sought to cross-examine Mr. Palnwr regarding the same sales northwest of Tremonton/ that
there were no sales of interchange propPrties less rernok
from the subject property ( R. 89-90), nor was tlwir any
dispute that the highest and best use of the subject propC'rt.\· and t}w cornparables were both comnH·rcial interchangP locations for a service station.
Plaintiff agrees that the trial court has broad discretion to determine whether comparable sales offered
on dirC'rt examination are suffici<>ntly ::-;imilar to be of
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any aid to the jury (see cases cited under Point l(a),
supra). Plaintiff submits, howevn, that under the facts
noted and c:onsi<lering the important nature of the question of beiwfi b:;, the trial court abused its discretion in
JH'Pdnding evidence of all five sales offered by plaintiff.
rrhe following summary of testimony by the appraisers compared with the amount of the special verdict will
indicate the prejudicial nature of the court's error:

Benefits
Palmer -

defendant (Exh. D-2). _____ $

360.00

360.00
Hmith - plaintiff (Exh. P-4)____________ 8,580.00
(Exh. D-3) ___ _

l\lr. Cain -

plaintiff (1£x11. P-5) ____________ 63,509.60

Jury Verdict (R. 302) ------------------------------

540.00

It can be seen that when not one sale is admitted into
evidence out of 5 offered a8 comparable sales the jury
found little basis upon which to adopt any part of the
conclusion of plaintiff's appraisal "-itnesses as to benefits
to defendant's land.
Although plaintiff attempted to somehow discredit
the small lwndit8 placed upon defendants' remainders
by pointing out an option \\-hich had been taken on land
two blocks mray from thP other Snmvville interchange
( R. 152) and the fact that plaintiff's mn1 appraisal witJH'8s, l\I r. Cain, had made a personal
in writing to
<l<'f<'ndants to lmy the northwest remainder for more
than tlw after vain<> placPd th<'n•on by defendants' apprai8er;;;, (R. 188-189) n<'V<'rtl1el<'ss without the evidence
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of the comparable sales which the court excluded on both
direct and cross-examination the jury was left with no
real basis upon which they could accept the conclusions
of plaintiff's appraisers as to benefits.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO STRIKE MR.
CHADWICK'S TESTIMONY OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES
BASED UPON SPECULATION, AN ERRONEOUS UNDERSTANDING OF THE FACTS, AND NON-COMPENSABLE
ITEMS OF DAMAGE.

(a) Jlr. Clwd1rick failed to sitbstantiate that the
South remainder 1ras i11 fact redllced fri 11al11e lJecause his testimO'n!J 1l'as /Jased,

l 1) Upon an l'rro11eous m1derstandi11g of jC1;cts!
and
(:2) l -pon remote, speculative, a11d uncertain

damages.

(h) Any sn:cra11ce damage u·hich ma,11 lune bern

shozcn H"as based 11pon a reasonaldc r'.rcrci.s€' of !hf'

police power and was 'I/On-compensable.

( 1) Danw,qc lwsed upon a reasonable change in
access is non-compensable.

(2) Dmnage based upon additional trarel time
and 1·11convn1ie11ce 1·s 11011-compcnsable, whether
the daniage is due to (a) an i11creasr in costs
of operation or (lJ) additional trm·cl tinie to and
f rmn defendants' residence.

In addition to substantial damages placed upon the
two north rPmainders the dd'<>ndants' appraisal witness,
Don .J. Chadwick, damaged the south remainder cornpris-
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ing 497.63 acres by 15% (Exhibit D-3, R. 109) or a total
damage to the south remainder of $5,225.12 ($3545.12 to
thP north 3:-n.G3 acres of the south remainder and $1680
to the south 160 acre portion). (Exhibit D-3, R. 106-107) .
.Mr. Chadwick listed three reasons for his opinion of
damage to the south remainder:
l.

2.

A ehange in the points of ingress and egress
•to the south remainder.

lncr<-'USf' in defendants' cost of ope.ration due

to additional time and inconvenience involved

in bringing machinery into the south remainder. (This was also stated as a basis for
damage to the northeast remainder. (R. 122))
Defendants additional travel time to and
from his residence. (R. 107, 117)

ikm shall be discussed separately below. The
witness stated that each of the above three items contrilmted about equally to his 15% damage figure, stating
in res1wns<> to questions asked by plaintiff on crossrxamination, as follows:

''BY MR. EV ANS: Q. I think, Mr. Chadwick,
T got all tlw r0asons down for the damage you
claim was caused to the south remainder: ingress
and ('gress \Yas one, increase of costs was another?
A.

For operation.

Q.

Did I miss any?

A.

For 01wration. Yes, he has a travel time
addition to get to his property too.

Q. ·Travel tirne1

A.

Uh-huh.
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Q.

Any others then or is that about it?

A.

Loss of time or travel time would be considered.

Q.

This is the travel to and from-

A.

Yes, The increased travel time and distance
to get to it.

Q.

From

A.

F'rom his home.

*

-41'

•

Q. v\T ell, I'm asking you just which do you feel
is the most damaging of these three that
you've indicated, or do you consider them to
be all fairly closely
A.

I'd place them relatively close.

Q.

Maybe thirty to forty per

A.

Somewhere.

Q.

Each causjng this fifteen percent damage?

A.

Yes." (R. 107-109)

Plaintiff moved to strike lHr. Chadwick's testimony.
as to damage to the south remainder because it was based
upon non-compensable elc_lments of damage. Defendant
resisted plaintiff's motion on the grounds that they were
nevertheless factors which a willing buyer would consider. rrhe court thereupon denied plaintiff's motion to
strike
plaintiff submits was <>rror. (R. 110-114)
(a) Mr. Chadwick failed to sitbstantiate tha.t the
south or northwest remainders were in fact reduced in
vafo.e becaitse his testimony was based (l) upon a-n
erroneous understanding of facts not in evidence, and
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(2) ilpon remote, speculative and uncertain damages.

(1) rrhe fads were not disputed that defendants
were kft with unlimited access to the south remainder
at every point along its north boundary to both the stock
trail and US Highway 30 relocation, except for about
300<3CJO fed where tlw stock trail joins the US Highway
30 relocation. (Attached Exhibit P-1; R. 126, 207, 211).
1\f r. Chadwick's opinion was based upon the misunderstanding that defendants W('re only left with two access
points along the stock trail for ingress and egress along
the north boundary of the south remainder, and, with
no dirf•ct access to US Highway 30 relocation (R. 115116). He first stated that the only access defendants had
to the
r(lmainder was from the south 160 acre portion of the south remainder. (R. 109) Later, however,
Mr. Chadwick indicated there may he a couple of points
to the stock trail where defendants also have access,
but not directly to US 30. (R. 115) On cross-examination
l\Ir. Chadwick responded to questions asked by plaintiff
regarding access to the south remainder as follows:

"Q.

So that you are assuming that Mr. Larkin is
going to gd "'hich way to his property? Come
down U.S. 30 and enter at this poinU

A.

\Vhich }Jiece of property?

Q.

On the west.

A.

On the south?

Q.

Isn't that the property that you said you damaged bPcause of travel?

A.

\Vell, yt>h. I mean you're talking about the
south property now, aren't you¥
"Q. \Veil, I'm talking about whichever prop- \

.. 1)

{{ J'
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have damaged him. If he lived on it. And if he
was dependent upon Highway 30.

Q.

Well, if he'd lived, say, up here next to it on
Highway 30 and he had an access at that
point, thPn would you have damaged it7

A.

It depends on the slope of the approach of
how steep of an incline he's got to come in and
out of to get to his property.

Q. \iV ell, assuming it were rPasonable so that any
machinery could have gone in and out.
A.

If it had been just a culvert over on level
ground, it could have possibly caused none.
But outside of the loss of ground.

Q. lf it had been acquired though to take his
cattle through or for any machinery to go
accross without any problem or undue inconveni<>nce, then there possibly would not
have be<:'n damage to the south remainder;
is that
A.

Possibly not as heavy. (R. 109-110)

* * * *
Q. Do you know at which points he has access

along the stock trail or are you just presum-

A.

not indicated exactly by map here.

on your

I'm asking you if you know.
A.

Yes, I've seen them, but now to point them
out in relation to this border line or that
border line, they're not so indicated on here.

Q.

\Vell, approximately, if you can.

\

/"'\!.A-

•-

I
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Pny it was you damaged because of the incon-

venience of travel from his home.
A.

Okay. The only way he can enter that on the
south-

Q.

It is the south property we're talking about,
isitnot1

A.

Yes. The only way he can enter that on the
south is by virtue of the other land that he
owns, the additional land that he bought of
lGO acres, and then come back into it.

Q.

Come down here and come back out 1

A.

Come back into it.

Q.

And that's the basis for your increased damagf' due to the severance on the south remainder?

A.

Partially, yes.

Q.

So had Mr. Larkin lived down here, his home
had be(•n down lower-well, at the bottom of
the south piece-then you wouldn't have damaged anything for the taking; is that correct 1
I mean as a result of the inconvenience of
travel.

A.

\Vell, if a man lives on his property he's minimized his travel.

Q.

\Vould you have given it any damage in that
case, if he had lived next to his south border
here1

A.

It depf'nds on what he used Highway 30 for,
hecanse that's his mode of quick access for
high an<l
road the year around under all
eireurnstanrPs of weather. So that will de1wnd a lot on how it's damaged. Yes, it could\
\

c)',
.
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A.

Vv ell, there's one right along in this area

here, and then there's another one right along
at this point in here where you can come in.

Q.

Okay, now how else can he gain access to his
property?

A.

From the highway he can't gain access.

Q.

He cannot gain it from the access?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Is
any other point he has access to the
property?

A.

Back from in this way he can.

Q.

From where?

A.

From down in this other section where he
bought.

Q.

Down from section sixteen?

A. Yes.
Q.

And what is that? Where is that?

A.

That's down in this area here.

Q.

I mean where is the access point.

A.

vVe 11, I can't give you exactly where it is, but
it's along in this area here.

Q. Just immediately south of the creek, huh?
A.

Yes, as I recall.

Q.

That's a road, is it, that comes through there?

A.

As I recall it.

Q. All right, now are those all the points of
acc('ss that he has to his remainder parcels?
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A.

\Vdl, outside of water in his stock. 11 here's a
trail that leads down this way, and there's
also one that goes down this way. It's a trail.

(l. Do those trails give the defendant access to
his property1

A.

Just for tlw cattle to go to the water.

Q.

All rigl1t, have we talked about all of the access, according to your understanding, the
defendant has to his property1

A.

Yes." (R. 115-116)

r[1}1e defendants are also left \Vi th full access to the
north-west remainder along U.S. Highway 30 relocation
from its west boundary east to the arrow indicating nonaccess line, but not to the old US Highway 30 which will
be torn up. However,
Chadwick thought defendants
had only one point for ingress and egress which was
located at the west end of US Highway 30 relocation,
and that defendants would have access to the old US
f iighway 30 although construction plans indicate this
8tretch would be torn up and would not provide access
even if defendants land did abut the old highway in the
first place. (Exhihit P-1; R. 7, 125) In referring to two
acres adjacent to Highway FS 30 relocation at the west
end of tlw nortwest remaindPr where Mr. Chadwick
thought defendants' had their only point of access to US
30, l\lr. Chadwick indicated on cross-examination of
plaintiff as follows:

"Q. And are you referring to the commercial
use of the property that would be around with
that two acres out?
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A.

If thl) two acres were sold off, he that would
own the two acres would definitely control
the other acreage, and its value, because they
have blocked his entrance.

Q.

Because whaU

A.

He's blocked his entrance.

Q.

I'm not sure I understand that. Who's blocked
whose entrance?

A.

\Vell, if he sold, if Mr. Larkin sold the two
acres on the extreme west end of that triangle

Q.

That's where my finger is

A. Yes.
Q. Uh-huh.
A.

Then how can he get into that ground?

Q.

You mean the only point of access that he has
is along those two acres on the west end?

A.

Might even have to be beyond that because
of the steep incline that's got to be on there
now to enter the two acres. Your only logical
approach is to go on over to where this access
leaves the old Highway 30 or else come back
in on Highway 30.

Q.

Approach to the land after the two acres are
sold?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You mean to come in from this direction?

A. •That's right.

Q.

On both (old) Highway 30?
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A.

Yes.

Q.

vV ell, now, if you assume that the road is

A.

Only by permission from whom he sold to.

Q.

I see. You were in court, I assume yesterday
when the engineer testified that this old U.S.
30 would be torn up and would no longer be
part of the public highway system'

A.

No, I was not here.

going to be torn up or that the defendant
<loesn't own the frontage along that road, then
how would he enter the property'

Q. ·But what you're saying in effect is that then
the remainder becomes landlocked then?

A. Yes.
Q.

And for that reason it's severed or it's reduced from about fifty percent in value, the
remainder, in value?

A.

About fifty per cent, yes." (R. 119, 120, 121).

l\Ir. Chadwick thought the grade at the west end of
the northwest remainder was 7' high (R. 103) where in
fact construction plans indicate it would be less than
in 4lj2 ft. high. (R. 128, 136)
Damages based upon facts not in evidence are incompetent and should not be allowed to stand. In the
City of Albuquerque v. Chapman, 76 N.M. 162, 413 P.2d
20-1 ( 196G), the Court reversed the judgment of the trial
court due to the appraisers misunderstanding of the facts
upon which his appraisal was based. The court stated:
"The foregoing testimony, based almost en-
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tirdy on inaccurate dimensions and mathematical
calculations as well as undeveloped reasoning, is
recited in detail to demonstrate its incompetency
to establish either before and after market values
or off-setting benefits. Thus, any findings of the
court based thereon are without substantial support and must fail. Opinions by real estate appraisers on 'before and after' market values must
bo considered in connection with related facts on
which they are based, and a satisfactory explanation must be given as to how the witness arrived
at his conculsion. (Citing Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Ptak, 236 Ark. 105, 364 S.W.
2d 794 (1963))
"In view· of \\·hat was been said, \Ve have no
alternative but to reverse the judment and remand t1H• case for retrial." 413 P.2d at 208.
In the Ptak case cited in Chapman, the Supreme
Court of Arkansas reversed the judgment of the trial
court who allowed testimony of a realtor who was not
familiar with total acreages, distances of improvements
from the right-of-way, with construction plans or with
the proposed status of the property after completion of
the work, and who stated that he appraised the property
entirely on a frontage basis. The court stated:
"\'le think it apparent from the quoted testimony that the witnPss \\·as not sufficiently familiar with the properties as to make a proper appraisal, and that under these circumsances, his
testimony cannot be considered substantial evidPnce. In fact, the trial court evidently strongly
considered striking testimony ... Subsequently,
however, the court denied the motion." 364 S.W.
2d at 798.

Plaintiff submits that l\lr. Chadwick's testimony
slionld have lwen strieken as to damages he placed upon
tlw south and northwest remainders since they were
n1wn an rrroneus understanding of defendants rernaining a<·c<•ss. :J\1 r. Chad\vick admitted that part of his
damage to the south remainder was due to his misunderstanding that defendants had no direct access to US 30
(H. llG-117), and that if lie had known they did have
such access his testimony would have been different. (R.
110).
Chadwick's tesfonony as to damages to the
south l'l'maind<T was remote, speculative and uncertain.
11 <' tLdn 'l
hm1· rnnth further defendants would have
to travel ("an extra mile or a quarter of a mile"-R. 117)
There was no testimony of what machinery is brought
into the south remainder or \vhat it cost extra to move
the machinery. There was no indication of how the machinery relates to the fair market value of the land, or
where the machinery or the defendants would be traveling to or from, or how often this travel takes place.
Any damage based upon the foregoing factors would
be speculative and uncertain and should not have been
allowed to remain for the jury's consideration.
(

"Damages allowed to flow from the taking of
part of a tract are not allowed if they can have
no effect upon present market value. Thus,
damages that are too contingent, speculative and
remote to affect the present market value need not
be considered." 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain p.
564 §14.241 ( 3d. ed.)

"No one can seriously contend that, in view
of the evidence in this case, it js possible at this
time to say that any materjal damages will be
suffered by appeXa,nts in case of the enlargement
of the canals. If this be true, then it must follow
that the future damages, if any, that appellants
may suffer, are such are denominated 'remote,
imaginary, uncertain, and speculative.' Such
damages, it has been frequently held, should be
disregarded." Tanner v. Provo Bench Canal and
Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 105, 121, 121 Pac. 584
(1911).
(b). Any severance damage• which 1nay ha1Je been
shown was based upon a re.asonable exercise of the police
power and was non-compensable.
This court has held on many occasions that not all
factors which may reduce the value of a remainder
parcel are compsensable. Damages caused by a reasonable exercise of the states police power are not compensable withjn the meaning of §78-34-10, Utah Code Ann.
(1953), even though they are factors which a willing
buyer would consider in a purehase of that parcel.
The right of the state to exercise its police power is
well founded. Reasonable means for controlling traffic
and insuring public safety is essential. The cost therPof
would be prohibitive, however, if every control and regulation reasonably exercised in the public interest was
compensable.
There are numerous examples of the proper exercise of police power where the landowner must bear the
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burden of damages caused to his land affected thereby,
L/
though such exeri-ese would adversely affect the
price a willing buyer would offer for the land. The effect of a zoning ordinance will certainly affect the
highest and best nse land can be put to, bnt an owner is
not entitled to compensation for land based upon what
its highest and best nse would be without the zoning
rrstriction. State Road Commission v. Utah Sand and
Gravel Prod1tcts Co., 22 Utah 2d 411, 454 P.2d 292
(19G9).
Other examples of police power causmg non-compensable damages include:
"Diversion of traffic from the abutters property because of the construction of a new highway
(State Road Commission v. Hislop, 12 U.2d 64,
3G2 P. 2d 580 (1961); State Road Commission v.
Rozzelle, 101 U. 4G4, 120 P.2d 276 (1941), the
installation of raised median strips in the centers
of a highway, preventing access to abutting land,
prohibition of left and "U" turns, and development of divided highways (Springville Banking
Co. v. Burton 10U.2d100, 349 P.2d 157 (1960), the
limitation of the mode of traffic on an avenue;
the substitution of one way traffic; and implacement of curbing along
(Citations
added), Campbell, The Limited Access HighwaySonie Aspects of Compensation, 8 Utah L. Rev.,
12, 17-f (19G2), containing an excellent discussion
of police power in connection with limited access
highway condemnation.
Each of the three items upon which Mr. Chadwick
based his opinion of severance damages to the south
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remainder
closely related m that tl1ey all involve
damage caused by time and inconvenience of travel
through a change in access. (R. 117) Each of the items
is discussed below, however, with authorities indicating
that each item represents a proper exercise of the police
power and should not be the basis for appraisal testimony of damages.
(1) Darnage based upon a reasonable change in
access is non-compensable.

Plaintiff contends that the changes in access to the
defendants remainder parcels were reasonable and a
JJroper exercise of its police power and thereby any
diminution in value as a result thereof is not
compensable.
In Utah this Court had adopted the position that a
landowner does not have a property right to direct
access to a specific facility at every point along his
frontage. Rather, in the absence of an established easement he has a right to reasonable access to the general
system of public roads, and a frontage road may satisfy
that right. This was the holding of State Road Comm. v.
H(J)nsen, 14 Utah 2d 305, 383 P.2d 917 (1963).I in which
defendants operated an auto wrecking business on 21st
South Street, Salt Lake City, along which plaintiff took
a portion running the full block between 6th and 7th
"\Vest. In the before condition defendants had full access
to 21st South although they had constructed a protective
fence with entrance space gate outlets. The portion

which was taken was considerably wider along the
eastern half to accomodate an access road, which would
run westwar<l from 6th West parallel to 21st South and
then turn south into 21st South at right angles about half
way between Gth and 7th vVest Streets. The defendants
had full access along the boundary between defendants
remaining property and the access road, while the boundary west of the access road was designated as a limited
access line with no proposed access to 21st South.
This Court upheld the lower court's refusal to
permit defrrnlants to prove and evaluate damages for
tl1n limitation of access to 21st South Street, and
affin1wd vlaintiff:s riglit 1:nder its police power to prescribe reasonable limitations upon access to a highway,
stating:
"Arising out of the necessity to properly discharge its duty of providing public highways, it
is recognizf•d that the sovereign may, under its
police power to conserve the health and welfare of
the people, prescribe reasonable limitations upon
access to the highways. (citing 8 Utah L.Rev. 12).
Ahsc)nt an established easement, all the abutting
owner is eHtitled to is some• reasonable means of
access to the highways the same as all other
nwn1hers of the public ....
"The assertion, which may well be true, that
the property as a whole would have a greater
value with unlimited access from 21st South, does
not JH'o\·ide a basis for compensation. It is settled
in this jurisdiction that tlw landowner has no
property right in the flow of traffic on a highway
. . . . " 14 U.2d at 310-311. See also 8 Utah L.
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Rev. 12,
also Ray v. State Highway Commission 19() Kan. 13, 410 P.2d 278 (1966) cert.
den. 385 U.S. 820; and State Road Commission v.
Danfelser, 72 N.M. 361, 384 P.2d 241 (1963).
The facts in the II ans en case and the instant case
are very similar. In both cases defendants sought
damages arising out of additional business costs
allegedly caused by the taking (see Point II (b) (2),
infra). In the Hansen case defendants' original access
along 21st South was replaced by access to an aiecess
road with about one half of the frontage. In the instant
case defendants retained access to their south remainder
directly from the highway and with the construction of
the stock right of way actually enlarged their total frontage along which they had access to the public road system
(see attached Exhibit P-1).
In the Hansen case the jury determined by special
interrogatory that defendants aGcess was not unreasonable. In the instant case there was no testimony that
--defendants were left with unreasonable
not
\
\
have direct access to US Highway 30 defendants' appraisal witness still felt access was reasonable. He stated \
on cross-examination by plaintiff as follows:

"Q. In your opinion, Mr. Chadwick, has the
state left the landowner with reasonable, access
to his remaining parcels 7
"A. He has a stock trail south of the -

"Q. Whatever he has, is it in your opinion
reasonable or unreasonable 7
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"A. It isn't as accessible and handy as he had
before.

"Q. Mr. Chadwick, my question is whether or
not in your opinion the access that the defendant
landowner has been left with, considering the
highest and best use of the land, is reasonable or
unreasonable.
"A. It has damaged
lessened his access.

his

property.

It's

"Q. Now would you answer my question,
vlease?
"A. State your question again, please.

"Q. Has the access that he was left with
reasonable or unreasonable in light of the use of
the property, in your opinon?
"A. Well, in my opinion the access is reasonable, but it's less reasonable than what he had
before. (R. 112-113)
All the evidence pointed to the reasonableness of the
access left to defendants. They had more frontage with
access after the take than in its before condition. Less
of it was on the paved highway due to the fact that the
stock trail was only graveled, but the stock trail was a
50' wide public right-of-way suitable for travel by automobile and could not very well be said to be unreasonable
for a cattlt> grazing operation. (R. 7, 129, 133, 134, 211).
Furthermore, plaintiff was ready to place
approaches and gates at any point desired by defendants
or to not even fence the open access frontage if defend/:.//
ants so request. (R. 7, 16, 1:29, 131, 13'7). Also, defendt._l;!U;t2f;j:3i;131J;:A"IB&,-de'feooa11 ts
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ants could now
:;i.ccess from the east by turning
south on a County road known as Locomotive Springs
Road which joined the new stock trail approximately 1Yt
to 1112 miles east of defendants property and by then
traveling that distance along the grayeled right-of-way,
which provided a through right-of-way along defendant's
land to the US Highway 30 relocation. The foregoing of
course is in addition to any other points of access defendants had along the east, south or west borders which
remained undisturbed by plaintiff. (R. 109, 115, 129,
131-132)
In State Ro.ad Commission v. Utah Sand and Grm;cl
Products Company, 22 Ftah 2d 411, 954 P.2d 292 (1969),
defendant complained of the court's instrnct1on that the
effect of traffic regulations and control de·vices effecting
traffic should not be considered. Plaintiff had taken a
921 ft. strip of land along the west of US Highway 89,
including the controlling of traffic hy the closing of
access along the frontage to a point whert> it met a
county road. The county road abutted defendants land
on the south crossing Highway 89 almost at right angles
providing access to defendants land at that point.
This court agreed that defendant was left 'vith
reasonable access notwithstanding the inconYenience of
having to travel 921 feet at most, or about l/6th of a
mile to get on or off Highway 89. Thr Court stated:
" ( S) everenco damage also is not forthcoming
where access denied at onr placP, nonetheh•ss
reasonably is available at another, although it
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may involve some degree of inconvenience." 22
Utah 2d at 414-415.
(2) Damage based upo n additional travel time and
1

i11convenie11ce is non-compensable, whether the damage
is due to (a) an incrfase in costs of operation or (b)
additinnal tra1·el time to and froni defendants residence.
Damages cam;t>d by (a) an increase in costs of
01wration, and (b) additional travel time required behn•en the south remainder and defendants residence
were thP 2nd and :3rd factors7 res1wctivelv
. .J n11on which
Chacl\\·ich hascd his opinion of severance damages
to tlw south remainder. As indicated by Mr. Chadwick
these ikrns
so closely related that they shall be considered together. (R. 117)
Many of the cases in which defendants have sought
damages for circuity of travel involved defendants who
are business entities, and the increase in travel for
which they songht compensation constituted an additional business cost item. This court has consistently
11eld that damages camwd by circuity or inconvenience of
travPl arc non-compensable so long as the action by the
state which caused such circuity was not outside what
would he a proper exercise of the states police power.
In 4 Nicholas on Eminent Domain, p. 491, §14.1 (3rd
Ed.) the rnle is stated as follows:
"Inconvenience of travel occasioned by being
required to travel a more circuitous route due to
a completed highway improvement is not a proper
subject for a damage award."
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In 1929, this Court held in the case of Robinett v.
Price, 74 Utah 512, 280 Pac. 73G (1929), that injury
sustained as a result of circuity of travel and inconvenience of access shared by the public generally is not
compensable. In the Robinett case the City of Price
closed a street which had given the landowner direct
travel to the business district of the city from his land
on which he maintained a building used as an automobile
sales room and for general automobile repair. After the
closing irftead of traveling 200 feet the landowner was
required to travel approximately nine tenths of a mile to
reach the business district.
In denying the landowners right to recover damages
as a result of the closing and discontinuance of the
street this court held that notwithstanding the inconvenience of taking the circuitous route and the decrease in
the value of the owne,rs property by the change in route,
"such inconvenience and injury are not in kind and
degree special entitling the defendant to compensation
for resulting loss or injury occasioned thereby." 74 Utah
at 515.
Other cases also inolving damages to business due
to a change in traffic flow have affirmed the gf•neral
principal that under such circumstances a property
owner is not entitled to compensation for a loss of business on his property caused by such change in traffic
patterns. llV eb<'r Basin Water Conscrn111cy District v.
Hislop, 12 Utah 2<l G4, 362 P.2d 580 (19Gl) : State Road
Conimission v. Ro,z,zelle, 101 Utah 464, 120 P.2d 27G
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( 1941). Neither should an increase in the cost of business
operations due to a proper exercise of the police power
be a compensable item.
Subsequent to the holdings of the above cases the
Hansen case (discussed under Point II(b) (1), supra)
was decided by this Court where in addition to their
claim for loss of access defendants also claimed compensation for additional business costs in removing several
Jmndred salvage automobiles and a considerable quantity
t1f parts. This Court upheld the trial court's refusal to
permit defendants to prove and evaluate these costs
which were incurred in their business as a result of the
condPrnnation.
That a landowner does not have a right to travel in
any particular direction under the police power of the
state was reiterated in Hampton v. State Road Comm.,
21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 (19G8), which cited with
approval the following language from State Highway
Comm. v. Meier, 388 S.W. 2d 855, (Mo. 1965):
'' .... 11he right (to access) does not include the
right to travel in any particular direction from
one's property or upon any particular part of
the public highway right-of-way because, after
one is npon the highway he has the same right as
all other travelers and the right of travel is a
public right and controlled by the police power of
the stah>. Nor does the right of ingress or egress
to or from ones property include any right in and
to existing public traffic on the highway, or any
ri O"ht to have such traffic pass by ones abutting
praoperty. The reason is that all traffic on public
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highways is controlled by the police power of the
state, and what the police power may give an
abutting property owner in the way of traffic on
the highway it may take mvay, and by any such
diversion of traffic the State and any of its
agencies are not liable for any decrease of
property values by reason of such divernion of
traffic, because such damages are 'damnum
absque injuria' or damage without legal injury
.... "21 Utah 2d at 346-347
The above language from Nichols and from the
Hampton cases were quoted with approval in State Road
Commission, v. Utah SHgar Company, 22 Utah 2d 77,
448 P. 2d 901 (19G8), which held that the landowner was
not entitled to severance damages because of extra costs
to the owner caused by its employees having to use a
longer route to inspect the company's canal after the
freeway construction. The court noted that the time and
inconvenience of travel by following a circuitous route is
a proper exercise of the police power and not
compensable.
1

"Keeping the above authorities in mind, it
seems inescapable to conclude other than that the
(1) inconvenience of travel to and from the
banks of the canals, by a more circuitous route,
coupled with the uncontroverted fact that access
was available, though more difficult, and ( 2) that
it is well settled by our own cases that inconvenience and expense with respect to personality are
not compensable, - the canal riders' efforts
should not be a compensable item of expense.
carved ont of the principles mentioned above, for
premium treatment ...
"Under such circumstances, it cannot be gain-
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said that the exercise of the police power is a
must adjunct to such a project, although in the
community interest, one or more citizens may
suffer some pecuniary loss. Such loss is justified
and paid for by the implied consent of citizens
reasonably to sacrifice some interests for the common be1wfit of all. Without any exception of
which I know, this court, and the authorities
gt iwrnlly, have stood fast agaim;t any accepted
r\ siliency of this firmly-rooted American interdiction." 22 Utah 2d at 80.
1

As noted above (see Point 11 ( b) ( 1), supra), in the
Utah S(rnd and Gravel case defendants sought damages
for having to trm·d an additional 921 feet at most (an
additional bm;iness cost item), about one sixth of a mile,
to get on or off the highway in conjunction with its busin<'s::; activities, but the court there held the same to be
,,,degree of inconyenience to the landowner:

<

evPn though it may involve some
" ( Pverance damage also is not forthcoming
where acce::;s is denied at one ?tee, nonetheless
reasonably is available at another, although it
may involve some degree of inconvenience." 22
Utah
at 414-415.

The Utah Suga.r Cornpany case was distinguished in
State Road Commission v. Hooper, 24 Utah 2d 249, 469
P.2d 1019 (1970), wherein the landowner "'as allowed
to prove damages for the cost involved in traveling
three extra miles to maintain his canal due to a take
by the state of a portion of the canal service road which
ran parallel to the freeway. The take reduced the width
of tht> S('lTiee road ( ffoctively destroying it for vehicular
1

traffic. Unlike the Hooper case where the damage was
caused by the states taking unrelated to any reasonable
exercise of police power, the alleged circuity of travel
in the Utah Sugar Conipany case and in the instant case
could have been accomplished by the exercise of the
states police power unaccompanied by a taking,
Although there was a taking, any circuity of travel could
have been accomplished without the taking of land being
involved. Certainly if the alleged damages for which
compesation is sought could have occurred through a
proper exercise of the states police power without a
taking and thereby been noncompensable, there is no
reason why a landowner should be entitled to compensation merely because the same damages were accompanied
by a take. The difference between whether damages
should be allowed for circuity of travel and inconvenience
should not depend upon whether the access was or was
not accompained by a physical taking of land. (See 8
U.L.R. 12, 19-18)
In the instant case the state could have altered
defendants' access to its highway system giving thPm
the same amount of access frontage on the same type of
right-of-way without any taking of real property. Drfendants' change in access was reasonablP under the
State's police power and is, therefore, non-compensahlr
(see Point II (b) ( 1), supra). Certainly any inconvenience of travel and costs resulting therefrom as a resnlt
of that reasonable change is not compensable.

Having based his testimony upon non-compensable
elements of damage the opinion of an expert witness
should be excluded.
"The same rule of exclusion applies to legally
non-cognizable elements of damage. rrhis is an
implicit exception to the willing seller - willing
buyer concept of market value. Though it is true
that such participants in a voluntary sale may
give considt:"ration to elements which unquestionably
a depreciating effect npon value, if an
element is dwnnitm absqup, injuria no consideration may lw given thereto. As one court said:
'01Jinions of witnesses based upon supposed
elements of damage which were not recognized by Jaw as proper to be considered in
condemnation proceedings should have been
excluded. Only such opinions as are based
on evidence of lawful elements of damages
can be of benefit to a jury in the assessment
of the amount of damage. ' " 5 Nichols on
Eminent Domain p. 18-18±, §18.42(1) (3rd
Ed.).
"If there is no substantiating evidence to fortify the opinion or if the elements considered by
the witness it'reaching his opinion are irrelevant,
spceulati,,e and conjectural, or otherwise incompetent, tlw opinion should be excluded." 5 Nichols
on Eminent Domain pp. 18-215 to 217, §18.45(1)
(3rd Ed.).

The trial courts failure to strike l\fr. Chadwicks
testimony of damage to the south remainder was prejudicial to plaintiff. Had that testimony been stricken
the highest net damage placed upon all remainders by all
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those testifying would have been that of defendants'
other appraiser, Mr. Palmer, in the amount of $5262.80,
not Mr. Chadwick's $7669.87. In other words, the damage
placed by Mr. Chadwick on only the south remainder of
$5225.12, was almost as much as the total amount of
severance damage on all three remainders testified to by
defendants' other appraiser, Mr. Palmer. (Exhibits D-2
and D-3)
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY TO DISREGARD DEFENDANTS REFERENCE ON CLOSING ARGUMENT TO
A LOSS IN THEIR CATTLE OPERATION OF 44
CATTLE CAUSED BY THE STATE'S TAKING.

As set forth in the trial court's Statement of Pro-

ceedings (R. 310) defendant argued during his closing
argument on rebuttal that as a result of the taking by
the state defendants had lost the means to graze 44
cattle. Such a statement was objected to by plaintiff as
being an improper appeal to the jury and plaintiff
moved the court to instruct the jury to disregard such
statement, which motion was denied. (R. 200-201) Such
statement was improper for the following reasons:
(1) It was without any support in the evidence
whatsoever. There was no testimony that defendants
could or ever did support anywhere near that many
cattle on the 79.493 acres taken plus the two north
remainders.

(2) To argue any reduction in the number of cattle
which defendants can now graze is an improper appeal
tu the jury to compensate defendants for loss of business
profits. As noted under Point II, supra, loss of business
profits is not a compensable item:
"It is well settled that when land occupied for
business purposes is taken by eminent domain, the
ownPr or occupant is not entitled to recover comrwnsation for the destruction of his business or
the jnjury thereto by its necessary removal from
its established location. Furthermore, as the
business is something entirely distinct from the
market value of the land upon which it is conducted, it is not considered in determining the
value of such land except so far as it illustrates
one of the uses to which the land taken may be
put. The reasons for this rule are doubtless
sound. Any modification of this rule might lead
to countless claims for damages, some fraudulant
and all difficult to appraise fairly. But unquestionably the rule sometimes works great hardship." 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain pp. 434-437
(3rd Ed.).

( 3) An appeal to compensate for loss of the procluctivi ty of land taken is an appeal to be compensated
twice for the same take. \Vhen fair market value is paid
for land, such payment compensates for the loss of the
use thereof. The price paid for land used for business
purposes is based upon the amount of that land's return
or prodnction for the money invested. In other words
<lefrndants can invest the fair market value amount
received for the take and receive as great a return on
that investment as they would from their return on the
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cattle operation on that land. The value of the land is
determined according to what it can produce. The value
of the land taken was stipulated by the parties at $70 per
acre. Defendants' appeal for compensation for loss in
the number of cattle defendants' could graze is a violation of that stipulation.

It is submitted that defendants argument regarding
a reduction of 44 cattle caused by the states taking is not
directed toward any showing of fair market value of the
land but was directed toward an appeal to the jury to
compensate defendants for the loss of profits from their
livestock operation, and the jury should have been
instructed to disregard any such appeal.
POINT IV
THE COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO
ALLOW TESTIMONY OF THE REMOVAL FROM
DEFENDANTS REMAINDER OF GRAVEL SOLD
DEFENDANTS
TO
PLAINTIFF'S
CONBY
TRACTOR.

(a) Testimony which indicates a change in condition

of the land should be admitted when the jury has viewed
the land in its changed co ndition.
1

(b). The benefit received from the sale of barrow
is a special uerriefit properly offsetting severnnce
damages.

Upon the date of take all the existing US Highway
30 frontage along defendants' northeast remainder ·was
generally at grade with US-30 at all points (R. 128, 148),
and was considered suitable for future cormnerrial

development by plaintiff's appraisers. (R. 184). However, subsequent to the date of take, defendants contracted with the highway contractor for the sale of barrow (R. 9, 199) to be removed from approximately the
west half of the northeast remainder parcel creating an
excavation at that point and causing a steep slope from
the highway not conducive to commercial development,
(R. 194). vVhereas before there had been a ridge running
north and south along the west end of this perce1. (R.
5) which would give it good exposure to traffic from
t>itlier direction (R. 139), at the time of trial when the
project was 75% completed (R. 7, 14) this rather deep
excavation was evident during the jury view of the
property. (H. 9)
Prior to the trial, the court ruled in chambers
against the admission of any testimony of the removal
of barrow. (R. 199). The court reiterated this position
on two occasions during trial when plaintiff's counsel
asked the project engineer to describe what change in the
appearance of tl1e land had occurred subsequent to the
date of take. ( R. 9-11, 128-129) In sustaining defendants'
ohjt>ction thereto the con rt stated:
"Now if
going into anything about the
land itself difforent than 1969, December 24, the
objection is sustained." (R. 129)
The jury was not told of the sale of barrow nor of
the facts in connection with the excavation. Having seen
at the time of the jury view they were
the
]pft to conjecture as to the effect it should have upon
their determination of damages.

(a) Testimony which indicates a charnge icn condition

o/ the land should be admitted when the jury has viewed

the lan·d in its changed condition.

The court refused to admit evidence of the change
m the land because it occurred subsequent to the date
of take. (R. 129) Yet the jury is required to award
damage caused by construction of an improvement, which
construction almost always occurs subsequent to the date
of take. Utah Code Ann. §78-34-10(2), (1953). For this
reason testimony as to construction which has already
taken place on the land should be admitted and was not
objected to by defendants even though occurring after
the date of take. But to allow explanation of some
construction then exclude explanation of another portion
of the construction when the whole had been viewed by
the jury was error.
The error occurred because the jury was mislead
and confused. The excavation for barrow was not set
apart from the construction but abutted the take and
could have easily been confused by the jury upon viewing
the premises as being a part of the construction for
"Thich they were to award damages.
Even defendants' appraiser, Mr. Chadwick, was
confused as to how to handle the change in the slope of
the area caused by the excavation until prompted by
counsel for defendants. Referring to the change in the
condition of the slope caused by the excavation in tliti
west half of the northeast remainder, plaintiff asked
Mr. Chadwick:
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"Q. You mentioned part of the damage was
caused by slope.
"A. Well, it's the south end of that hill that
lies in that taking in there. Right about where
your hand is.

"Q. In this area to the west¥
"A. Yes. Yeh, the west end of that forty-four
acres.
''Q. B nt the slope wasn't changed at all in the
before and after condition by the taking of the
state, did iU It remained the same f

''A. \Yell, in the taking there has been changes,
yes.
"Q. In the slope of the south (northeast)
"A. Yeh, there's been changes made there,
but there's -

"Q. Caused by the take of the state and the
"A. \Vell, we'll go back to the day of the
taking. rrhc slope was in there.

''Q. That's right.
"A. Okay. And that is the day on which I
appraised it is the day of the taking of that
property, and there was a hillside, shallow loam
and gr aye lly base.
"Q. Tliat's right. And that was at what date¥
"A. That was on the 24th of December in '69.
"0. Yes. Now after that date you are not saying that there was any damage or any change in
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that slope caused by the construction, are you?
"MR. MANN: No, he hasn't said that at all.
"A. No, I haven't said that.
"l\IR. MANN. He said that on that prior date
the soil was shallow and it wouldn't produce
annual crops.
"MR. EVANS: I don't think he needs tliat
kind of help.
"MR. MANN:
122-123)

I think that you do.

(R.

courts have held that testimony should have
been Sttbinitted to clarify the jury view of changed
premises where the property as changed rnjght mislead
the jury, in which case they are entitled to testimony in
i (!!'?
explanation and clarif
of the change to better
understand the original property even though as in the
case of negligence actions, changes or alterations in
property after an injury are generally not admissible to
show the negligence. Evidence which is inadmissible for
one issue may be admissible for another issue. State v.
Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P.2d 764 (1949).
L' I

In St. Loitts Southwest Railway v. Jackson, 242 Ark.
858, 416 S.W. 2d 273 (1967), the Court cited 170 A.L.R.
7 and 64 A.L.R. 2d 1296, as indicating that testimony to
show changed conditions of matters viewed by jurors
was admissible. In this case involving a railroad crossing, new signal lights which were brighter than the
original lights at the time of the accident were adrni:ssiLle
to show conditions at the time of the accident. All of the
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jurors, noted the Court, would undoubtedly have seen
and become accustomed to the new lights and might
have been mislead or confused by testimony about their
dimness at the time of the injury so the Judge did not
abuse his discretion by allowing such evidence. Therefore, it did not appear to matter to the Court whether
or not the jury had an official view as jurors (whether
considered evidence or not). The main concern was for
clarifying any misconception that might arise because of
th(' change.
Panaquolis v. Philip JJI orris & Co., 95 N.H. 524, 68
A.2d 672 ( 1949), held that although change in condition is
g-en<>rally inadmif':-:ihl'' ;;1 negligence cases, it was error
to exclude such testimony if by reason of a view or
testimony it appears that conditions are different from
what they were at the time of the accident.
Redrn.an v. Cormnunity Hotel Corp., 138 W. Va. 456,
7G S.E.2d 759 (1953) involved a death caused by a boiler
explosion. Dt>f endants objected to testimony of subsequent changes, but the Supreme Court of Appeals of
\Vest Virginia upheld the admission, saying:

'"vV e think the facts in the instant case bring
it within the exception to the general rule indicated in the cases just cited. Here the jury viewed
the premises and, necessarily, saw the steel
supports attached to the boiler. They had been
informed that the break in the steam pipe resulted
from the tilting of the boiler, ·which they could
have believed would have been impossible had the
supports been attached at the time of the explosion. They wen•, therefore·, entitled to be told
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the truth as to the time of the attachment of the
supports. Probably an instruction given by the
court, limiting the effect of the evidence, would
have been proper, had a motion to do so been
made by either of defendants."
Clarification of the removal of the barrow was at
least admissible as going to the question of ·what damages
caused by construction were not to be considered by the
jury. Tho jury was left confused without clarification
of those damages caused by the voluntary arrangement
between defendants and the contractor, and those for
which plaintiff should compensate defendants. :B"Jxplanation of this fact should have been given to the jury.
(b) The benefit received from the sale of barrow is
a. special benefit properly offsetting serverance damages.

In view of the lower courts firm stand in chambers
prior to trial against allowing any evidence concerning
defendants sale of barrow plaintiff urged at least the
admissibility of the fact of its removal as evidence of the
changed condition of the land. (R. 199). However, it is
plaintiff's position that the lower court was in error not
only in barring evidence of the fact of the removal of
the barrow (discussed under Point IV(a), supra), but
specifically in indicating its refusal to allow evidence of
the benefit defendants received from their sale of barrow
to the contractor.
The amount of benefits to defendants remaining
parcels by the highway construction shall off set
damages. Utah Code Ann. §78-34-10(4), (1953). Bene-
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fits which may constitute an offset are those benefits
which are direct and special and not such as are received
in common by the whole community. This rule was laid
down in Hempstead v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah, 261, 90
Pac. 397 ( 1907), in which the Court quoted with approval,
the following language from Roberts v. Cmn'rs, 21 Kan.
*247, *252 (1878):
" ' (T)ho benefits which may be taken into
consideration for the purpose of reducing the
damages to be awarded to the landowner are
such as are direct and special as to him and his
land, and not such as are received in common by
the whole community, and with reference to
cause and effect they are such as are direct,
certain, and proximate, and not such as are indirect, contingent, or remote. It is true that
incremwd value of the land is often taken into
consideration in fixing the amount of the
damages; but this is done only where such increased value arises from such direct, special,
and proximate cause . . . . making some
other valuable improvements on or near the land
Ly means of ·which the owner will be enabled to
enjoy his land with greater advantage. That is,
the increasPd ntlue must be founded upon something which affects the land itself directly and
proximatt>ly. It must be founded upon something
which increases the actual or usable value of the
land, as ·well as the market or salable value thereof, and not such as increases merely the market
or salabl0 value alone.'" 32 Utah at 271.
The Court went on to assert that:
"The test is not ·whether the improvement
affects one or more owners by creating special
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advantages to their property; but whether the
bene.tit::s are 1!1 fact such as add anything to the
convenience, accessibility, and use of the property
as contradistinguished from benefits arising
incidentally out of the improvement and enjoyed
by the public generally." 32 Utah at 272.
The sum received by condemnee from the sale of
dirt to the contractor for highway construction is a
special benefit inuring to the condemnee rather than a
general benefit which inured to all property owners in
the area of the highway improvement, and hence such
sum could properly be offset against the amount of
severance damages. This was the holding in Louisiana
Department of Highways v. McPherson, 241 So.2d 54:3
(La. App.1970), wherein the Court stated:
"Fundamentally, the benefit must be one that
is special to him rather than a general benefit to
all property in the area of the improvement.
"The road contractor buys the dirt necessary
for constructing the required grade of the highway from abutting property owners, if possible,
in order to save hauling costs. It is logical that
the contractor will pay more for dirt that does not
have to be hauled and lies adjacent to the construction
In the case at bar the defendant
sold dirt from 48.5 acres for over $1,200.0 per acre
average. The maximum value of the land as
contended by defendant was $500.00 per acre. By
the sale of the dirt from this acreage he has
realized a sum which doubles his own estimate' of
market value. We consider this to be a special
benefit, and the amount receiYed over the estimated market value should be credited against
any severance damages awarded. This is in
accord with the previous holding of this court in
the Williams case, supra." 241 So. 2d at 549
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff was improperly restricted by the court in
establishing the amount of special benefits inuring to
defendants. The court abused its discretion by finding
that all five sales offered on direct examination of other
interchange properties in Box Elder County lacked
sufficient similarity to the subject property to be
admitted. But certainly when offered on cross-examination any such lack of similarity should have gone to the
weight, not the admissibility. Also testimony of the sale
1irice of barrow sold by defendants to the contractor
sliould have been allowed as evidence of special benefits
rPcPi\·ed by defendants.
The court also ruled improperly as to evidence
going to the question of the amount of severance damage. The opm10n of Mr. Chadwick, defendants'
appraiser, as to the amount of damage to the south remainder should not have been allowed to remain in
evidence. l\Ir. Chadwick failed to understand basic facts
ti.s to damages and
essential to arriving at an opinion as to damages
and his opinion of such damages was based solely
upon the fact of an admittedly reasonable change
in access. An owner has no right to unlimited access
at all points fronting upon a public highway. Plaintiff,
by the police power, may control access to and from
the abutters trart without the payment of compensation, unless the control is found to be unreasonable.
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Also the court should not have allowed defendants to
argue the decrease in their cattle operation, and should
have allowed testimony of the changed condition in the
land caused by the removal of barrow.
A new trial should be granted for the proper determination of benefits and damages.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
JOHN T. EVANS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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MAP SHOWING THE PROPERTY OF
REED E. LARKIN, ET AL
AND THAT PORTION REQUIRED FOR
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